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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal arises from the forfeiture of a bond in a criminal proceeding. It presents a
straightforward issue: \Vhether a bail bond company can seek relief from a bond forfeiture order
in an independent civil action after denial of an exoneration motion in the criminal proceeding
and failure to appeal from that denial.

The material facts are similarly straightforward and

undisputed.

I.

THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL PROCEEDING

The State of Idaho filed a criminal complaint on May 8, 2008 in the Fourth Judicial
District Court, Ada County, against Elliot Bailey, alleging delivery of a controlled substance in
violation ofldaho Code § 3 7-2732( a) and driving without privileges in violation of§ 18-8001 (3).
R

5. Bailey executed a notice of court date and bond receipt on May 11, 2008, reflecting a

bond amount of $150,000 with the surety agency identified as Best Bail Bonds and the
bondsman as Steven K. Ellefson. R Ex. 20. 1 A superseding indictment for violation of§ 372732(a) was filed five days later. R Ex. 18.
Following Bailey's failure to appear at hearings on October 20 and November 3, 2008,
the district court judge presiding over the criminal proceeding declared the bond forfeited. R Ex.
51. The district court clerk forwarded notice of the forfeiture to Best Bail Bonds and Ellefson at
the latter's mailing address in Boise on the same date, advising them that "[i]f within one
hundred eighty (180) consecutive days from the above date of the order forfeiting bond, you
bring said Defendant to the jail facility of the county which issued the warrant, the Court shall
direct that the forfeiture be discharged." R Ex. 53. 2 Law enforcement officers apprehended
Sun Surety does business in Idaho through Best Bail Bonds as its "local agent." R p. 24 ~ 8;
see also R p. 111 (power of attorney related to bond posted for Bailey issued by Sun Surety).
2
The clerk's notice was addressed as follows:
1

Bailey on November 6, 2008. R Ex. 54. He eventually entered into a plea agreement that
resulted in entry of a judgment of conviction and sentence for violation of § 37-2732(a) on
March

2009. R Ex. 65.
Ellefson did not ignore the forfeiture notice. He filed a motion to set aside the forfeiture

and to exonerate bond on January 29, 2009. R Ex. 60. The motion read:
Steve Ellefson, who heretofore posted the above referenced undertaking of bond of the
above-named defendant, said bond having been forfeited by this court, hereby moves
this court for an Order setting aside said forfeiture of bail and exonerating the same
pursuant to authority set forth in LC.R. 46(e) on the following grounds: Defendant was
arrested and warrant returned prior to the expiration of the ninety day period.
Id 3 The district court denied the motion on March 12, 2009 "without prejudice for lack of
approval by [the Trial Court Administrator's] office." R Ex. 71. On May 1, 2009-178 days
after the bond forfeiture order-an attorney for Sun Surety moved to set aside the forfeiture and
exonerate the bond under LC.R. 46(e) and (g). R Ex. 72. 4 The motion identified three grounds
for exoneration: (1) "a bench warrant was issued and the bond was forfeited by the Court on

Best Bail Bonds
Steven K Ellefson
P.O. Box 7985
Boise, ID 83707
R Ex. p. 53. The address entry was taken verbatim from the information supplied on May 11,
2008 in a Notice of Court Date and Bond Receipt. R Ex. p. 20.
3
The reference in the motion to "the ninety day period" likely was to the immediately preceding
codification of Idaho Code § 19-2927 included in Appendix A and in effect at the time of the
Bailey litigation. Section 19-2927 was amended effective July 1, 2007 to increase the period of
time from 90 to 180 days for, inter alia, "a person, other than the defendant, who has provided
bail for the defendant" to surrender the defendant to law enforcement authorities and thereby
exonerate the bail undertaking. 2007 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 175, § 1. Unless otherwise indicated,
all references to provisions in Title 19, Chapter 29 are to its codification as effective on July 1,
2008.
4
All references to Rule 46 are to its codification as of the period between November 3, 2008 and
May 29, 2009. The relevant rule is included in Appendix B.

2

November 3, 2008, for defendant's failure to appear[;]" (2) "the bench warrant issued for the
Defendant's arrest was returned on November 6, 2008, with the defendant having been arrested
and in custody[;]" and (3) "the defendant appeared before the Court and was arraigned on
November 24, 2008." R Ex. 72-73. The district court denied the motion on May 29, 2009 with
this explanation:
This motion is hereby DENIED without prejudice. Pursuant to LC. § 19-2927, the
Defendant has not appeared within 180 days after failing to appear and satisfactorily
excused his neglect; moreover, a person posting the bond has not surrendered the
Defendant to a jail facility within 180 days of the Court's entry in the minutes the fact
of Defendant's failure to appear.
R Ex. 73. Sun Surety took no further action in the Bailey criminal proceeding to challenge the
bond forfeiture order.

II.

THE CIVIL ACTION BELOW
Sun Surety commenced the proceeding below on November 2, 2010-17 months after

the Bailey district court denied its second motion to set aside the bond forfeiture. R p. 4. It filed
a verified amended complaint on January 5, 2011, alleging in part:
9.
The Trial Court Administrator was initially notified that the Supervising Agent
of Best Bail Bonds was Steve Ellefson and that forfeiture notices should be mailed to
him at P.O. Box 7985, Boise, Idaho 83707.
10.
On or about July 2, 2002, the then Trial Court Administrator the Honorable
Darla Williamson, District Judge, predecessor to Judge Michael E. Wetherell and Ada
County Clerk were notified that, effective June 1, 2003 and after, the Supervising Agent
of Best Bail Bonds was amended to be Patrick Wood who was to be given statutory
notice of all forfeitures by fax at (605) 348-0778 or by mail to 21 Main Street, Rapid
City, South Dakota, 57701. On July 9, 2003, Assistant Trial Court Administrator
Burrell replied to said letter noting that Mr. Wood was acknowledged to be the
Supervising Agent, but stating that they would mail notices only to the person posting
the undertaking of bail, pursuant to the then provisions ofldaho Code Section 19-2927.
11. Thereafter, however, contrary to the contents of the Burrell letter and consistent

3

with Mr. Wood's request, forfeiture notices for Best Bail Bonds were properly and
regularly mailed by the Ada County Clerk to Patrick Wood in Rapid City, South Dakota
at Sun Surety Insurance Company. In 2007, Idaho Code Section 19-2927 was amended
to provide that notice of forfeiture was required to be mailed to the person posting the
undertaking of bail or his "designated agent".

*****
13.
On or about the middle of August, 2008, Steve Ellefson left the employ of Sun
Surety Insurance, Inc. On August 21, 2008, Ellefson was appointed a bail agent for
Lexington National Insurance, a competitor of Sun Surety Insurance Company.
Thereafter, he was no longer a Designated Bail Agent for Sun Surety. The Defendants
knew or should have known Ellefson was no longer in authority for Sun Surety.
14.
The Trial Court Administrator and the Clerk remained in regular mail
communication about Sun Surety forfeitures with Patrick Wood during the months of
August, September and October of 2008, continually confinning and informing him of
failures to appear as the Surety and Designated Agent for Best Bail Bonds. On
October 2, 2008, Defendants Reiner and Williamson sent a form letter to Sun Surety
and Wood noting that a statutory change required the Clerk to mail notices of forfeiture
of a surety bond to the Surety or its Designated Agent.
R pp. 24-25. The "statutory change" referred to in paragraph 14 of the amended complaint was
to the 2007 amendment to § 19-2927 that added the phrase "or, if the bail consists of a surety
bond, to the surety or its designated agent" to the end of the first sentence in the section's
opening paragraph. 2007 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 175, § 1. 5
The amended complaint contained six "causes of action": (1) a declaratory judgment
concerning whether, inter alia, Sun Surety was "entitled to the exoneration of the Bailey bond
because of the Clerk's failure to give Plaintiff the notice of forfeiture mandated by the former

5

Sun Surety appended one letter between the Trial Court Administrator's office and Ellefson and
Patrick Wood related to the former' s status as an agent of Sun Surety to an affidavit submitted by
its counsel with its memorandum opposing the motion to dismiss. R p. 116 (Sept. 3, 2008 letter
from Assistant Trial Court Administrator to Ellefson with copy to Wood concerning Ellefson's
authority to post bonds on Sun Surety's behalf). It additionally appended to the affidavit notices
of bond forfeitures issued on November 7, 13 and 14, 2008 that were mailed to Wood at his
Rapid City address. R pp. 117-19. None of the correspondence referred to in paragraphs 10 and
14 was before the district court.

4

Idaho Code Section 19-2927 and former I.C.R. 46(a) [sic]" (R p. 29 ,r 34.A): (2) injunctive relief
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 65 or through ~Tits of prohibition or mandate against payment under the
forfeited bond (R pp. 30-31 ,- 37); (3) quasi-estoppel (R p. 31

,r

40); (4) impossibility of

performance because "Plaintiff and its agents were fully capable of locating or attempting to
locate Bailey on or before November 6th , 2008 when he was returned to the Court had they
received time notice from the Clerk of his failure to appear on November 3rd , 2008" (R p.

,r

43); (5) "equitable relief' under I.C.R. 46(e)(4) (R p. 32 ,- 46); and (6) exoneration pursuant to
Idaho Code § 19-2922-a statute which became effective on July 1, 2009 but which Sun Surety
characterized as procedural (R p. 35

,r 53).

Sun Surety identified no statute that authorized a

right of action other than, arguably, Idaho Code §§ 7-301 to -314 for a ~Tit of prohibition or
Idaho Code§§ 7-401 to 404 for a writ of prohibition.
Respondents moved to dismiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), arguing that "[a]llowing Sun
Surety to proceed with a collateral attack now would create an end-run around the nom1al
requirements for challenge by means of a timely direct appeal, undermine the finality of the
District Court's [bond forfeiture] judgment, and disregard the law's interest in litigation repose."
R p. 64. As such, they contended that the amended complaint was a "quintessential candidate for

res judicata." 6 After converting the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a summary judgment proceeding
6

Respondents also directed more specific arguments to the "causes of action" related to
prohibition and relief (R pp. 7 5-77), quasi-estoppel (R pp. 77-78), impossibility of performance
(R pp. 77-80), and the attempted application of§ 19-2922 to this proceeding as a "procedural"
statute (R pp. 80-81 ). Sun Surety addresses only the quasi-estoppel "cause of action" in its brief
before this Court and therefore must be deemed to have abandoned the other three. ,\Jyers v.
Workmen's Auto. Ins. Co. 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004) ("In order to be
considered by this Court, the appellant is required to identify legal issues and provide authorities
supporting the arguments in the opening brief. ... A reviewing court looks to the initial brief on
appeal for the issues presented on appeal."); accord Indian Springs L.L. C. v. Andersen, No.
38369, 2012 WL 4055340, at *7 (Idaho S. Ct. Sept. 14, 2012); Jacklin Land Co. v. Blue Dog RV,
Inc., 151 Idaho 242,248,254 P.3d 1238, 1244 (2011).

5

,vith Sun Surety's concurrence (R pp. 148, 152-53), the district court agreed that claim
preclusion barred the collateral attack.

It reasoned that the "same parties" or their privies

requirement was satisfied because, "[a]s can be readily observed in numerous Idaho Appellate
Court cases, Sureties seek relief regarding surety bond issues in the underlying criminal cases"
(R p. 156 Ls. 18-19) and "this Plaintiff and same Defendants in the present suit are the Parties
who would have been involved in ... [exoneration] motions" (R p. 157 Ls. 3-4). As to the
"same claim" requirement, the court stated that Sun Surety's contention that "it is entitled to
exoneration because the Clerk failed to give proper notice pursuant to the former Idaho Code
§ 19-2927" (R p. 157 Ls. 1 14) and the attendant "causes of action" could not evade "[t]he
reality that neither [Sun Surety], nor I, can overcome is that these 'matters ... might and should
have been litigated' before [the Bailey criminal case judge]" (R p. 157 Ls. 21-23). The "final
judgment" requirement existed given settled authority that "[a] trial court's order denying
exoneration of a bail bond is a final order under I.A.R. 1 l(a)(l)" and the court's view that that
"[t]here is no distinction made [in such authority] as to whether or not the order is without
prejudice." Rp. 159 Ls. 7-10.

ISSUES PRESENTED

I.

Whether Sun Surety possessed a private right of action to challenge the Bailey court's

bond forfeiture in an independent civil action.
II.

Whether Sun Surety's action was barred by claim preclusion.

III.

Whether Respondents are entitled to attorney fees on appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court "applies the same standard as the district court when ruling on a motion for
summary judgment." Soignier v. Fletcher, 151 Idaho 322, 324, 256 P.3d 730, 732 (2011).
Under that standard,

6

[s]ummary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ... The
movant has the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. ...
Disputed facts and reasonable inferences are construed in favor of the nonmoving party.
Id. (citation omitted). It is equally settled that the Court may affirm on any ground that supports

the judgment. E.g., Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 580, 850
P.2d 724, 731 (1993) ("where an order of the district court is correct but based upon an
erroneous theory, this Court will affirm upon the correct theory").
ARGUMENT

I.

NO RIGHT OF ACTION EXISTS TO CHALLENGE A BOND FORFEITURE
ORDER IN AN INDEPENDENT CIVIL PROCEEDING
This Court has made clear that "[t]he right to relief from forfeiture of bail is governed by

statute" and that, under the statutes applicable at the time of the forfeiture here, the "right to
relief is governed by LC. § 19-2927." State v. Overby, 90 Idaho 41, 44, 408 P.2d 155, 156
(1965) (citing State v. A1ayer, 81 Idaho 111, 114, 338 P.2d 270, 272 (1959)). Section 19-2927 as
then codified provided, inter alia, that '"if at any time within twenty days after [the forfeiture
order's] entry in the minutes, the defendant or his bail appear and satisfactorily excuse his
neglect, the court may direct the forfeiture of the undertaking or the deposit to be discharged
upon such terms as may be just."' Id. Because the surety made application for the forfeiture's
exoneration outside the twenty-day period, its "motion came too late to secure the relief
requested." Id. The import of Overby to this matter is plain: Sun Surety must point to a specific
statutory provision authorizing it to maintain an independent civil action to seek exoneration of
the Bailey district court's forfeiture order. It identifies no such statute, and that failure dooms
challenge to the order.

7

The conclusion dictated by Overby and the earlier decided Mayer comes as no surprise.
Myriad appellate decisions have addressed the propriety of bond forfeitures. 7 Regardless of the
outcome, they share the common procedural characteristic of being appeals under I.A.R. 1l(a)(l)
from the criminal proceeding's district court ruling. The exclusivity of the direct appeal process
derives not only from the absence of any statutorily created right of action but also from the very
practical consideration that what is being reviewed is the exercise of discretion by the district
court. See, e.g., Two Jinn, 151 Idaho at 728,264 P.3d at 68 ("[t]he determination of whether to
set aside the forfeiture of a bail bond under fonner I.C.R. 46(e)(4) is committed to the discretion
of the trial court and will not be overturned absent a finding that the trial court abused its
discretion"). An independent proceeding displaces this Court's highly circumscribed review role
and the deference owed to the criminal proceeding judge's determination by allowing another
district court judge to address the exoneration issue de novo~a significant modification to the
scope of judicial authority. See City of Osborn v. Randal, 152 Idaho 906,908,277 P.3d 353,355
(2012) (overruling decisions that applied de nova standard to review awards of attorney fees
under Idaho Code § 12-117, and applying abuse of discretion standard); State v. Shutz, 143 Idaho
200, 202, 141 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2006) ("[t]he question of whether evidence is relevant is
reviewed de nova, while the decision to admit relevant evidence is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion"); State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 218, 16 P.3d 890, 894 (2000) (applying de nova and

7

E.g., State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 151 Idaho 725, 264 P .3d 66 (2011 ); State v. Rupp, 123 Idaho 1,
843 P.2d 151 (1992); State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 874, 230 P.3d 766 (Ct. App. 2010);
State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 148 Idaho 752, 228 P.3d 1019 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Castro,
145 Idaho 993, 188 P.3d 935 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho 651,
167 P.3d 788 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Vargas, 141 Idaho 485, 111 P.3d 621 (Ct. App. 2005);
State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 952 P.2d 1249 (Ct. App. 1998); State v. Plant,
130 Idaho 130, 937 P.2d 442 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Fry, 128 Idaho 50, 910 P.2d 164
(Ct. App. 1994).

8

abuse-of-discretion standards with respect to application of I.R.E. 609(a)). In practical and legal
effect, therefore, Sun Surety's action substitutes the statutory process for contesting a forfeiture
order-a motion under § 19-2927 filed within 180 days of the forfeiture order's entry into the
minutes for resolution by the judge presiding over the criminal action-and invests a district
court with greater decision-making authority than this Court possesses.
Instructive on the exclusivity of the statutory bond procedures and the obligation to
comply with its time limits are the Court of Appeals' decisions in Abracadabra and Vargas. The
fonner arose from a prosecuting attorney's enforcing a bond forfeiture through a contempt
motion rather than under the statutory procedure specified under the-then applicable codification
of Idaho Code § 19-2928. That procedure "authorize[d] the state to enforce a bond forfeiture
through a civil action." Abracadabra, 131 Idaho at 120, 952 P.2d at 1256. The Court reversed,
holding initially that the surety's relationship with the State was contractual in nature and that
"[t]he contempt power ... is generally not available for the enforcement of contracts between
parties and money judgments." 131 Idaho at 119,952 P.2d at 1255. The prosecuting attorney's
remedy instead lay "in a separate civil action" under § 19-2928. It then turned to the question
whether the statutory right of action superseded the common law writ of scire facias. The Court
answered that question in the affinnative:
Idaho has abolished the writ of scire facias. . .. Idaho, however, has authorized the
enforcement of a surety's obligation by motion, but in areas not including bail
bonds .... [1] In addition to I.C. § 19-2928, Idaho Criminal Rule 46 governs bail bond
forfeiture and enforcement. Rule 46 is silent, however, with respect to enforcing a bond
forfeiture without the necessity of an independent action .... Therefore, there is no
provision in the Idaho Code or the Idaho Criminal Rules authorizing the enforcement of
a bail bond forfeiture without the necessity of an independent action. Accordingly,
once proper notice is given and a surety fails to remit the forfeited bond, the prosecuting
attorney may proceed under I.C. § 19-2928 for enforcement of the forfeited bond.
131 Idaho at 120, 952 P.2d at 1256 (citations omitted). Abracadabra exemplifies the principle
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that the statutory bail bond prov1s10ns, as complemented by the Idaho Rules of Criminal
Procedure, control the remedies available upon bond forfeiture.
A major issue in Vargas was the surety's claim that the district court abused its discretion
by not extending the then 90-day period under § 19-2927 for the defendant to appear or be
brought before the court for purposes of a forfeiture order's rescission. The Court of Appeals
rejected the claim because the statute did not accord the district court the authority to extend the
period:
Section 19-2927, as quoted above, directs the court to exonerate forfeiture if the
defendant appears within ninety days of the forfeiture. The statute further provides that
the court may set aside the forfeiture and reinstate the bond if done prior to remittance
of the forfeiture and with written consent of the person posting the bond. However,
Section 19-2927 does not provide for an extension of the ninety days nor does it list any
exceptions and, thus, the statute does not confer upon a court authority to extend the
time specifically described by the statute. [1] Additionally, LC. § 19-2928, which
governs enforcement of the forfeiture, provides that if the forfeiture is not discharged,
the prosecuting attorney may, "at any time after ninety (90) days" from the forfeiture,
proceed to recover against the forfeited bail. It is clear from that statute that the
legislature anticipated ninety days as the time for enforcement of the bond forfeiture.
141 Idaho at 488, 111 P.3d at 624.

Vargas thus underscored that the period specified m

§ 19-2927 for the defendant's appearance or production was fixed and not subject to
modification.

Although 2007 Idaho Session Laws Chapter 175 doubled the period under

§§ 19-2927 and -2928, the Court's reasoning loses none of its force and dictates that Sun Surety
possessed only 180 days to seek exoneration before the Bailey court and that thereafter the
forfeiture was subject to enforcement. Allowing the surety to maintain an independent action
attacking the forfeiture vitiates the detailed and mandatory procedure created by the Legislature
under§§ 19-2927 and -2928.
Sun Surety's arguments below and before this Court established no basis to overwrite the
bail bond statute's exclusivity and to recognize an independent action of the sort here. As noted
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above, it advanced mandamus and prohibition "causes of action" in its amended complaint but
understandably has abandoned them on appeal. Neither of those remedies is available where "a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law" exists (§§ 7-303 and 7-402),
and the procedure in § 19-2927 indisputably provided just such remedy. Two of the "causes of
action" were remedial devices premised upon the existence of a substantive right of action. 8
Two others were affirmative defenses. 9

The remaining "causes of action" sought relief

unavailable outside the Bailey criminal proceeding context. 10
8

Sun Surety, in sum, failed to

The request for injunctive relief under Rule 65 and a declaratory judgment was so premised.
Other jurisdictions also have held that the Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act has no play, even
when a right of action exists, where a legislature has provided an exclusive remedial scheme to
adjudicate an entitlement to the asserted right. See, e.g., Cont 'l W Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Ins.
Co., 511 N.W.2d 559, 562 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994) ("[a]ctions for declaratory judgment are not to
be entertained where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided by law, nor are they
to be used to create new causes of action or cumulative remedies"); Nat 'l Capital Park and
Planning Comm'n v. Wash. Nat'! Arena, 386 A.2d 1216, 1222 (Md. 1978) ("where a specific
statutory remedy is available, it is mandatory for the court to dismiss the suit for declaratory
judgment and remit the plaintiff to the alternative forum"); Nelson v. Knight, 460 P.2d 355, 37172 (Ore. 1969) ('"it is neither useful nor proper to issue the declaration"' where, inter alia, "'a
special statutory remedy has been provided"') (quoting Edwin M. Borchard, Declaratory
Judgments 302 (2d ed. 1941)).
9
Quasi-estoppel, to which Sun Surety devotes substantial attention before this Court
(Br. Appellant 11-14), is a commonly pled affim1ative defense, not a substantive claim for relief.
E.g., First Fed. Sav. Bank v. Riedsel Eng'g, Inc., No. 38407-2011, 2012 WL 4450898
(Idaho S. Ct. Sept. 14, 2012); C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Highway Dist., 139 Idaho 140, 144-45,
75 P.3d 194, 198-99 (2003); Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 48 P.3d 1241
(2002). The same is true with respect to impossibility of performance-an affirmative defense in
the breach of contract context. E.g., Thorn Creek Cattle Ass'n v. Bonz, 122 Idaho 42, 43,
830 P.2d 1180, 1181 (1992); Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 733, 639 P.2d 429, 431
(1981); see also State v. Two Jinn, Inc., 151 Idaho 725, 728-29, 264 P.3d 66, 69-70
(Ct. App. 2011) (examining impossibility of performance claim in bail forfeiture appeal under
settled contract principles).
10
Sun Surety argues in its opening brief that "[a] Rule 46(e)(4) hearing could even take place
with the State v. Bailey case before Judge Neville, should this Court order one."
Br. Appellant 17. Not unexpectedly, it cites no precedent for this Court, much less the district
court below, to reopen the Bailey proceeding. In another now abandoned theory, Sun Surety
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establish a right to maintain an independent suit for the purpose of challenging the Bailey bond
forfeiture.

II.

CLAIM PRECLUSION BARS SUN SURETY'S ACTION
A.

Overview of Res Judicata Principles

This Court's modem precedent establishes that, "[a]lthough the literal definition of the term 'res
judicata' is expansive enough to cover both preclusion ofrelitigation of the same cause of action
and relitigation of the same issue, the modem tendency is to refer to the aspect of the doctrine
that precludes relitigation of the same issue in a separate cause of action as 'collateral estoppel,'
and to refer to that aspect preventing relitigation of the same cause of action as 'res judicata. "'

Rodriguez v. Dep't of Correction, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401,403 (2001). The elements of
claim preclusion, or true res judicata, and issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel (Peterson v

Private Wilderness, LLC, 152 Idaho 691, 695, 273 P.3d 1284, 1288 (2012)), and the differing
reach of the two preclusion categories have been summarized in multiple Idaho cases.
asked the district court to exonerate the forfeiture under a provision of Title 19, Chapter 29 that
became effective on July 1, 2009 on the premise that the new statute was procedural in character
and therefore retroactive. Rpp. 35 ~ 53 and 100-101. As with the Rule 46(e)(4) claim, it
identified no basis for the district court to apply the bail bond statute provision.
Sun Surety also now suggests that relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b) supplies "a narrow window
for the consideration of relief in Idaho." Br. Appellant 22-23. This issue was not raised below
and thus is barred procedurally. Beyond that lethal procedural defect, the surety offers no
authority for the proposition that the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to bond forfeiture
proceedings or, even if they do, that Rule 60(b) authorizes "an action for independent equitable
relief." Br. Appellant 23 (emphasis added). The rule itself prefaces the grounds for relief with
the phrases "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just[.]" I.R.C.P. 60(b) (emphasis added);
see generally Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2865
(2d ed. Westlaw Sept. 2012 Database) ("[r]elief under Rule 60(b) ordinarily is obtained by
motion in the court that rendered the judgment"). Sun Surety's reliance on dicta in State v.
Peterson, 153 Idaho 157,165,280 P.3d 184 (Ct. App. 2012), is inapposite (Br. Appellant23-24);
the relief requested there was brought by motion before the district court that issued the involved
order.

12

With respect to claim preclusion, this Court has explained:
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent action there are three requirements: (1)
same parties; (2) same claim; and (3) a valid final judgment. ... Claim preclusion
generally bars adjudication not only on the matters offered and received to defeat the
claim, but also as to matters relating to the claim which might have been litigated in the
first suit.
Wernecke v. St. Maries Jnt. Sch. Dist., 207 P.3d 1008, 1019 (Idaho 2009) (citation omitted).
Issue preclusion is attended by more factors and a less expansive substantive reach:
[F]ive factors must be evident in order for collateral estoppel to bar the relitigation of an
issue determined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party against whom the earlier decision
was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier
case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in
the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior
litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and (5) the
party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the
litigation.
Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 93, 29 P.3d at 404; see also Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp., 147 Idaho
186, 190-91, 207 P.3d 162, 166-67 (2009) (distinguishing claim and issue preclusion); Waller v.
State Dep't of Health and Welfare, 146 Idaho 234,238, 192 P.3d 1058, 1062 (2008) (same). The
Court has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Judgments fonnulation for detennining "finality"
in the issue preclusion context:

"[F]or purposes of issue preclusion (as distinguished from

merger and bar), 'final judgment' includes any prior adjudication of an issue that is detennined
to be sufficiently firm to be accorded preclusive effect." E. Idaho Agric. Credit Ass'n v. Neibaur,
133 Idaho 402,408, 987 P.2d 314, 320 (1999) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments§ 13
(1982)) (some internal quotation marks omitted); accord Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 94, 29 P.3d
at 405. 11 Claim preclusion exists here.
11

Comment g to § 13 of the Restatement counsels that, while ordinarily it is unnecessary to
adopt a "finality" date for claim-preclusion purposes that differs from the date of the final
judgment,
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B.

Application of Claim Preclusion Requirements

1. Same Party Requirement
A fundamental principle with respect to surety undertakings of the type here must be
emphasized in determining whether the same party requirement is satisfied here:
A bail bond agreement is a suretyship contract between the state on one side and an
accused and his or her surety on the other side, whereby the surety guarantees the
appearance of an accused.... The extent of the surety's undertaking is detennined by
the bond agreement and is subject to the rules of contract law and suretyship.
Castro, 145 Idaho at 996, 188 P.3d at 938 (citation omitted). Implicit in the contractual nature of
bail bond agreements is that any disputes over their application or enforcement are between the
parties and intended beneficiaries. The necessary consequence is that, no matter how captioned,
the real parties in interest presently are the State and Sun Surety, with Ada County as the
[b Jut to hold invariably that that kind of carry-over is not to be pennitted until a final
judgment in the strict sense has been reached in the first action can involve hardship-either needless duplication of effort and expense in the second action to decide the same
issue, or, alternatively, postponement of decision of the issue in the second action for a
possibly lengthy period of time until the first action has gone to a complete finish. In
particular circumstances the wisest course is to regard the prior decision of the issue as
final for the purpose of issue preclusion without awaiting the end judgment. ... Before
doing so, the court should determine that the decision to be carried over was adequately
deliberated and finn, even if not final in the sense of forming a basis for a judgment
already entered. Thus preclusion should be refused if the decision was avowedly
tentative. On the other hand, that the parties were fully heard, that the court supported
its decision with a reasoned opinion, that the decision was subject to appeal or was in
fact reviewed on appeal, are factors supporting the conclusion that the decision is final
for the purpose of preclusion. The test of finality, however, is whether the conclusion in
question is procedurally definite and not whether the court might have had doubts in
reaching the decision.
The Reporter's Note to Comment g adds that the comment "is new and builds upon decisions in
the Second Circuit[,]" including Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref Co., 297 F.2d 80
(2d Cir. 1961 ). The Note then quotes favorably the "finality" standard adopted by the Lummus
court: "'Finality in the context here relevant may mean little more than that the litigation of a
particular issue has reached such a stage that a court really has no good reason for pennitting it to
be litigated again." Id. at 89.
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beneficiary of any forfeited bail amounts. See § 19-2928 ("[i]f the forfeiture is not discharged, as
provided in the last section, the prosecuting attorney may, at any time after one hundred eighty
(180) days from the entry upon the minutes, as provided in the last section, proceed by action in
the name of the county, against the bail upon their undertaking"). The issue therefore is whether
Sun Surety can negate the privity requirement by naming as defendants the Fourth Judicial
District Court and various individuals in their official state capacities. So posing the question
effectively answers it.
Plainly enough, Sun Surety and the State were parties to the bond forfeiture proceedings
in the Bailey criminal action. The surety specifically alleged that it "caused two exoneration
motions to be presented to the Bailey court asking for equitable relief from the forfeiture" of the
bond, while the State was the plaintiff. R p. 27

~

23; Idaho Code§ 19-104 ("[a] criminal action

is prosecuted in the name of the state of Idaho, as a party, against the person charged with the
offense"). Its exoneration motion, moreover, sought to affect the County's entitlement to the bail
amount. This is enough for claim preclusion purposes. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho
119, 126, 157 P.3d 613, 620 (2007) (entity constitutes a "party" for claim preclusion purposes if
it "was the subject of noticed motions and hearings that directly affected its interests").
The individually named officials were no less plainly in privity with the State. First,
their only interests derive from their status as Judicial Branch officials or employees; they have
no other "dog in the fight." See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 403
(1940) ("[t]here is privity between officers of the same government so that a judgment in a suit
between a party and a representative of the [government] is res judicata in relitigation of the
same issue between that party and another officer of the government"); Gikas v. Zolin, 863 P.2d

15

745, 863-65 (Cal. 1993) (different governmental entities were in privity). 12 Second, the State
acted through the individual Respondents to implement Title 19, Chapter 29 and, more generally,
to preserve the integrity of the criminal process. See Two Jinn, 148 Idaho at 755, 228 P.3d at
1022 ("the primary purpose of a bail bond agreement . . . is to effectuate the defendant's
presence in court to answer the charges brought by the state."). In communicating with Sun
Surety about its bond, the individual Respondents promoted Sun Surety's adherence to the
alleged bond agreement and thereby furthered the State's interest in effective law enforcement.
And in opposing Sun Surety's claims now, the individual Respondents raise arguments no
different than those that the State would raise if it were the named defendant.

The first

requirement for claim preclusion is therefore satisfied. See Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 124,
157 P.3d at 618.
2.

Same Claim Requirement

Claim preclusion "bars adjudication ... as to every matter which might and should have
been litigated in the first suit." Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 126, 157 P.3d at 620 (quotation
marks and citation omitted). "In other words, when a valid, final judgment is rendered in a
proceeding, it extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions
out of which the cause of action arose." Id Because the concept of a claim is "broad," claim
preclusion "may apply even where there is not a substantial overlap between the theories

12

Respondent Wetherell's position as the Fourth Judicial District Administrative Judge is a
statutorily created component of the Judicial Branch. Idaho Code § 1-907. Respondents Reiner
and Burrell, in their capacities as Trial Court Administrator and Assistant Trial Court
Administrator, are employees of the Judicial Branch. Although named as a defendant, the Fourth
Judicial District is a geographical area and thus arguably not a juridical entity capable of suit.
Idaho Code §§ 1-801 and -805; see Two Jinn, Inc. v. District Court, 150 Idaho 647, 649, 249
P .3d 840, 842 (2011 ). However, even if subject to suit, the District would simply be an
administrative subdivision of the Judicial Branch-and hence the State.

16

advanced in support of a claim, or in the evidence relating to those theories." Id As this Court
reiterated in Knox v. State, 148 Idaho 324, 223 P.3d 266 (2010), claim preclusion controls "[n]ot
only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand,
but as to any admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose." 148 Idaho at
338, 223 P.3d at 290 (citing Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1983)).
No dispute exists that the claim before the Bailey district court was the same as the one
advanced in the amended complaint:

whether the bond forfeiture should be set aside and

exoneration ordered. While there is no allegation that Sun Surety's earlier motions involved a
claim about inadequate notice of Bailey's failure to appear and bond forfeiture, it is apparent that
this claim arose out of the same "transaction or series of transactions" as the earlier claims for
exoneration: The bond was the same; the criminal defendant was the same; the underlying
criminal case was the same; the surety was the same; the requested relief was the same; and the
lack of notice claim could have been raised.
On the last point, Sun Surety had ample opportunity in the earlier case to argue for
exoneration on the basis of inadequate notice. The amended complaint alleged that the surety
first learned of the failure to appear and bond forfeiture in approximately March 2009 (R p. 27
~

22) but also alleges that it filed the two exoneration motions "thereafter" (R p. 27

~

23). The

first motion, however, was filed on January 28, 2009 on its behalf by Ellefson-thereby
establishing that it had notice of the forfeiture substantially before March 2009. R Ex. 59. Even
if this effective admission of pre-March 2009 knowledge was ignored, Sun Surety knew of the
allegedly delayed nature of the forfeiture notice when it moved for exoneration on May 1, 2009.
R Ex. 72. With both knowledge of relevant facts and ample opportunity to argue them before the
Bailey court, Sun Surety could have sought exoneration on the basis of inadequate notice prior to
the end of the 180-day period specified in § 19-2927-the test for a full and fair opportunity to
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litigate a claim fully.

Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 795, 229 P.3d 1146, 1157 (2010);

Rodriguez, 136 Idaho at 92, 29 P.3d at 403.
3.

Final Judgment Requirement

Section 19-2927 imposed a 180-day filing obligation on exoneration requests.

The

statute granted district courts no authority to extend that filing period. Vargas, 141 Idaho at 488,
111 P.3d at 624. The Bailey district court accordingly possessed the power to deny Sun Surety's
first exoneration motion on March 12, 2009 "without prejudice" because the filing period had
not elapsed and the motion could be renewed within 180 days as of the November 3, 2008
forfeiture order. Its denial of the May 1, 2009 motion on May 29, 2009, however, was entered
substantially after the 180-day period concluded and thus was "final" as a matter of law,
notwithstanding the "without prejudice" proviso.
The decision in Quick Release Bail Bonds does not counsel a different conclusion.
There, Court of Appeals relied upon the first sentence in Rule 46( e)( 4) for the proposition that a
district court has authority to grant a motion seeking exoneration at any time before "remittance
of the forfeiture." 144 Idaho at 654, 167 P.3d at 791. In so holding, the Court distinguished

Vargas because the untimely motion in that case was directed not to exoneration but to an
extention of time to return the defendant to Idaho. Id

The validity of Rule 46(e)(4)'s first

sentence, as well as the Court of Appeals' construction of it, is suspect.

First, the third

paragraph of § 19-2927-from which the first sentence in Rule 46( e)( 4) presumably derivedauthorized a court, "before remittance of the forfeiture," only to "set aside the forfeiture and

reinstate the undertaking of bail or money deposited instead of bail" so long as "the person
posting the same" consents in wTiting. (Emphasis added.) The third paragraph did not permit a
court to exonerate the bail undertaking. Ver ska v. St. Alphonsus Reg 'l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889,
893, 265 P.3d 502, 506 (2011) ("The interpretation of a statute 'must begin with the literal words
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of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; and the statute
must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but
simply follows the law as written."'). Instantly, Sun Surety's bond neither was nor could have
been reinstated since the Bailey court set a new bond amount-$500,000-at the time the Sun
Surety bond was forfeited. R Ex. p. 51. Second, Rule 46(e)(4)'s first sentence cannot be squared
with the remainder of § 19-2927 that unambiguously establishes a 180-day period for the
defendant to appear and to seek exoneration.
subject to modification by rule.

That period is a substantive requirement not

Cf Two Jinn, 150 Idaho at 654-55, 249 P.3d at 847-48

(affinning invalidation of Trial Court Administator's guideline that required bail-related
documents to be signed by the bail agent, the superivising agent or the agent's attorney, and
reasoning that while"[ s]ome judges express frustration as to how long after forfeiture it takes the
bail bond agent to locate the defendant and return him or her to court[,] [t]he legislature has set
that time at 180 days, Idaho Code § 19-2927(5), which is a substantive statute, not simply
procedural"). The 180-day requirement in § 19-2927 for the defendant, or his surety, to appear
and to satisfactorily excuse his neglect is no less substantive than the 180-day requirement in
Idaho Code § 19-2922(5) as codified in the 2009 amendments to Title 19, Chapter 29.
After the May 29, 2009 motion denial, therefore, Sun Surety's sole remedy was an appeal
under LA.R. 1 l(a)(2). The surety elected not to appeal for reasons that it is at a loss to explain.
Br. Appellant 22.

An unappealed order denying exoneration satisfies the final judgment

requirement and, when the other elements of issue preclusion exist, bars a later suit on the
underlying claim. See Federated Dep 't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie,

U.S. 394, 398 (1981) ("A final

judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues
that were or could have been raised in that action.... Nor are the res judicata consequences of a
final, unappealed judgment on the merits altered by the fact that the judgment may have been
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\\ITOng or rested on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case.") (citations omitted);
C Sys., Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 563, 181 P.3d 485, 489 (2008) (applying claim preclusion

on the basis of an unappealed summary judgment in prior case); Gerken v. Davidson Grocery
Co., 50 Idaho 315, 320, 296 P. 192, 193 (1931) (prior "judgment unappealed from stands as a

solemn adjudication as to all the parties thereto, and it cannot now be attacked collaterally,
unless void on its face, except for fraud").
III.

ATTOAA1EY FEES SHOULD BE AW ARD ED UNDER I.A.R. 41(a) AND IDAHO
CODE§ 12-121
"This Court awards attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 4l(a) and LC. § 12-121

when it is 'left with an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation."' Berkshire Invs., LLC v. Taylor, 1

Idaho 73, 87, 278

P.3d 943, 957 (2012) (quoting Durrant v. Christenson, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 638
(1990). On appeal, Sun Surety has advanced a potpourri of theories-including the arguments
that (1) § 19-2927 is "nearly self-executing" (Br. Appellant 10); (2) the alleged lack of proper
notice creates an "equitable bar" (id. 11 (capitalization removed)) to the bond forfeiture; (3) a
hearing under I.C.R. 46(e)(4) should be directed (id. at 17); (4) the Bailey district court's
May 29, 2009 order did not give rise to claim preclusion (id. 17-22); and ( 5) relief under I.R.C.P.
60(b) is available (id at 22-24). Of these arguments, only the second and fourth were raised
below.
With respect to the issues that it did present below, Sun Surety offered no decisional
support for the proposition that quasi-estoppel provides a basis for an independent civil suit to
challenge a bond forfeiture order. Its claim preclusion analysis asks this Court to accept the
propositions that Respondents---all of whom are either the State itself or state officers and
employees sued in their official capacities-are not in privity with the State; that the claim
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before the district court below was not the claim before the Bailey district court notwithstanding
the fact that both sought exoneration of the bond forfeiture; that it was not provided a meaningful
opportunity to litigate its lack-of-notice claim even though nothing prevented it from advancing
it in either or both of the exoneration motions filed on its behalf; and that the May 29, 2009 order
was not "final" merely because the Bailey court denied it "without prejudice." On the last of
those claim preclusion elements, Sun Surety fails to address the express requirement in
§ 19-2927 that it appear before the Bailey court within 180 days to satisfactorily excuse its

neglect and that, once the 180-day period expired, the May 1, 2009 motion's denial necessarily
became final. Most :fundamentally, however, the surety failed to establish any plausible basis for
an entitlement to maintain an independent civil action to challenge a bond forfeiture subject to
Title 19, Chapter 27. This appeal is "without foundation."
CONCLUSION

The district court judgment should be affirmed.
DATED this 5th day of October 2012.
STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
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APPENDIX A
IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2927 AND -2928 (2008)

IDAHO CODE§ 19-2927 (2008)
Forfeiture of bail

If, without sufficient excuse, the defendant fails to appear before the court upon any
occasion when his presence has been ordered the court must immediately direct the fact to be
entered upon its minutes, order the forfeiture of the undertaking of bail, or the money deposited
instead of bail, as the case may be, and order the issuance of a bench warrant for the arrest of the
defendant. The clerk shall mail written notice within five (5) days of the forfeiture for failure to
appear to the last known address of the person posting the undertaking of bail or, if the bail
consists of a surety bond, to the surety or its designated agent. A failure to give timely notice
shall exonerate the bail or undertaking. If at any time within one hundred eighty ( 180) days after
such entry in the minutes, the defendant appears and satisfactorily excuses his neglect, the court
shall direct the forfeiture of the undertaking or the deposit to be exonerated.
If within one hundred eighty ( 180) days of the date of forfeiture, a person, other than the
defendant, who has provided bail for the defendant, surrenders the defendant to the jail facility of
the county which issued the warrant, the undertaking of bail or deposits are thereby exonerated.
The court which has forfeited the undertaking of bail, or the money deposited instead of
bail, may, before remittance of the forfeiture, and with the written consent of the person posting
the same, set aside the forfeiture and reinstate the undertaking of bail or money deposited instead
of bail.
IDAHO CODE § 19-2928 (2008)
Enforcement of forfeiture

If the forfeiture is not discharged, as provided in the last section, the prosecuting attorney may, at
any time after one hundred eighty (180) days from the entry upon the minutes, as provided in the
last section, proceed by action in the name of the county, against the bail upon their undertaking.

APPENDIXB
I.C.R. 46(e) AND (g) (EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 2007)

I.C.R. 46(e) and {g) (Effective July 1, 2007)

(e) Forfeiture and enforcement of bail bond. The court which set amount of a
bail bond may order the forfeiture and enforcement of the bond in any of the following
manners:
(1) In the event a defendant fails to appear before the court at the time required as
a condition of bail, and the court finds that such failure without sufficient cause, or where
no evidence is presented which will provide sufficient cause, the court shall immediately
ex parte forfeit bail and issue a bench warrant for the defendant.
(2) Upon a verified application of the prosecuting attorney alleging a person has
willfully violated conditions of the person's release on other than failure to appear, the
court may issue a warrant directing the person be arrested and brought before the court
for hearing, or the court may order the person to appear before the court at a time certain.
(3) Upon a bail revocation hearing, at which the defendant shall appear if the
person can be found, if the court finds that there has been a breach of conditions of bail,
and if the defendant is present before court, it may revoke the bail and remand the bailed
person to the custody of the sheriff, and may at any time thereafter reconsider the issue of
and may set new bail and impose other additional conditions.
(4) The court which has forfeited bail before remittance of the forfeiture may
direct that the forfeiture be set aside upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it
appears that justice does not require the enforcement of the forfeiture. If the court sets
aside the forfeiture, it may, with the written consent of the person posting the bail,
reinstate the bail, or the court may exonerate the bail, or the court may recommit the
defendant to the custody of the sheriff and set new bail or may release the defendant on
his or her own recognizance. The court shall give written notice to the person posting the
bail or, if the bail consists of a surety bond, to the surety or its designated agent of the
action taken by the court. Provided that within seven (7) days of the entry of forfeiture,
the court may, for good cause, set aside the forfeiture and reinstate the bail without the
consent of the person posting the bail and quash the bench warrant if still outstanding. At
the time of such reinstatement, the court shall provide written notice to the person posting
the bail, or, if the bail consists of a surety bond, to the surety or its designated agent.
(5) After the court enters the order forfeiting bail, the clerk must within five (5)
days, mail a written notice of forfeiture to the last known address of the person posting
the undertaking of bail or, if the bail consists of a surety bond, to the surety or its
designated agent. If the defendant does not appear or is not brought before the court
within one hundred eighty (180) days after the entry of the order forfeiting bail, the clerk,
upon receiving payment of the forfeited bail, shall remit such forfeiture to the county
auditor for distribution and apportionment as provided by § LC. 19-4705.

********
(g) Exoneration of bail. When the conditions of bail have been satisfied, or if the
clerk fails to mail a written notice to the person posting the undertaking of the bail or, if
the bail consists of a surety bond, to the surety or its designated agent within five (5) days
of the order of forfeiture, the court shall then discharge the bail, exonerate sureties, and
release any cash or property deposited with the court. If the defendant appears or is

brought before the court within one hundred eighty (180) days after the order forfeiting
bail, the court shall rescind the order of forfeiture and shall exonerate the bond.

